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Online Reputation and the  
Regulation of Information  





In recent years, online rating and reputational mechanisms have become increasingly 
important in the regulation of behavior in the platform economy. Consumers tend to rely 
on online reviews to distinguish between service providers both in the business-to-
consumer and the peer-to-peer economy. The European Commission and the Federal 
Trade Commission, as well as a strand of legal scholarship, have praised these online 
mechanisms for generating valuable information while reducing market failures and 
consumer risks. However, this position has overlooked evidence suggesting that the 
additional data provided by online reputation might not be able to address information 
asymmetries and manage risks due to the multiple shortcomings of existing online 
reputational mechanisms. In this article, I discuss the regulatory potential of online 
reputational feedback and offer a nuanced reflection on the traditional assumption that 
the availability of more information in the market reduces the need for public regulation. 
I suggest a co-regulatory framework for the regulation of online reputation that could 
help promote the transparency and trustworthiness of these informal enforcement 
mechanisms.  
I. Introduction 
Nowadays, after a visit to a hotel or restaurant, the most effective way of giving a 
compliment on a service might be to write a positive review on one of the countless 
booking and review websites such as Booking.com, Tripadvisor, or Yelp.1 The ubiquity of 
these reputational systems has been discussed in the past decade in the media and 
satirized in popular shows. In the American sitcom Community, “MeowMeowBeenz” is 
presented as a groundbreaking monitoring device that would allow students to rate both 
students and teachers and create a system where community members would be 
segregated on the grounds of their ratings. More recently, the Netflix show Black Mirror 
                                                 
 Chair of European and Comparative Public Law & Rosalind Franklin Fellow, University of Groningen, 
Faculty of Law, The Netherlands; Affiliated Fellow of the Yale Information Society Project. I would like to 
thank Frank Pasquale, Catalina Goanta, and the journal’s editors for their insightful comments. I also extend 
my gratitude to the members of the Maastricht European Private Law Institute for inviting me to present a 
preliminary version of this paper.  
1 Catheryn Khoo-Lattimore & Erdogan H. Ekiz, Power and Praise: Exploring Online Compliments on 
Luxury Hotels, 14 Tourism & Hospitality Res. 152 (2014). 
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took its viewers to a futuristic world where individuals are dominated by the fear of 
receiving low ratings. Such systems may seem like a frivolous matter pertaining primarily 
to the world of popular culture and having little legal relevance.2 However, a closer look at 
the impact of these reputational systems demonstrates that a sterile world of constant 
online monitoring and peer-review has been regulating several segments of our society for 
the past ten years with a level of granularity and control that the strictest regulators would 
envy.3  
Reputation and word-of-mouth have, for centuries, been regarded as alternatives 
to formal enforcement mechanisms, as they generate trust and provide a great deal of 
information to consumers. Relying on reputation is instinctive to humans and it is 
naturally perceived as a key instrument to promote cooperation.4 Indeed, the reliance on 
an individual’s good name has historically preceded state interventions such as modern 
authorization schemes (e.g., licenses, permits), periodic inspections, product liability rules, 
and regulatory sanctions. In the diamond or cotton industries, merchant traders reliably 
fulfilled their contractual obligations without the threat of regulation and public courts,5 
while investors decided whether a country would be likely to honor its debts based on the 
country’s reputation.6 In the last half-century, there has been a revival of interest in the 
interdisciplinary study of reputation, particularly with the development of the sharing 
economy and the flowering of user-generated content on platforms like Yelp.7 One of the 
key questions that remains unanswered in the literature is whether online ratings and 
reviews can replace traditional regulation in the management of consumer risks. 
                                                 
2 For an interdisciplinary analysis of reputation, see The Reputation Society (Hassan Masum & Mark Tovey 
eds., 2011). 
3 See Clayton P. Gillette, Reputation and Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce, 62 La. L. Rev. 1165 
(2002); Juan Jose Ganuza & Fernando Gomez, Product Liability Versus Reputation, 32 J.L., Econ. & Org. 
213 (2013) (discussing the relationship between market reputation and product liability regulations, the costs 
of market reputation, and arguing that the level of legal liability should not be reduced or eliminated when 
market reputation is available); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Online Reputation Management in Attorney 
Regulation, 29 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 97 (2016) (discussing the regulatory and psychological dynamics from 
online reviews in attorney regulation).  
4 John Whitfield, The Biology of Reputation, in The Reputation Society, supra note 2, at 39, 40. 
5 Barak Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants 
in New York, 31 Law & Soc. Inquiry 383 (2006); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal 
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private 
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 
Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001). But see Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A 
Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 912 (1994) 
(discussing the role of culture in contractual relationships and distinguishing between the Maghribi 
merchants’ collectivist cultural beliefs that explained their reliance on reputation and information networks 
and the individualism of the Genoese traders, who preferred formal contractual enforcement mechanisms). 
6 Michael Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation (2007). 
7 See, e.g., Werner Raub & Jeroen Weesie, Reputation and Efficiency in Social Interactions: an Example of 
Network Effects, 96 Am. J. Soc. 626 (1990); The Reputation Society, supra note 2; Grahame R. Dowling, 
Winning the Reputation Game: Creating Stakeholder Value and Competitive Advantage (2016); Lawrence 
McNamara, Reputation and Defamation (2007); Lucio Picci, Reputation-Based Governance (2011).  
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Regulators in Europe and the US as well as a strand of legal scholarship have 
suggested that online reputational mechanisms along with the self-regulatory practices 
implemented by digital platforms (e.g., background checks) are capable of addressing a 
number of market failures.8 The Federal Trade Commission (through its Economic 
Liberty Task Force) and the European Commission have praised the ability of 
reputational mechanisms to reduce information asymmetries in the peer-to-peer (“P2P”) 
economy.9  
This position, however, overlooks the shortcomings of online reputational 
feedback, does not elaborate on the interaction between reputation and traditional 
regulation, and assumes that the existence of abundant information in the market 
automatically alleviates the information asymmetries that typically justify state 
intervention. But more information does not always mean more knowledge, particularly 
when there is still little transparency on how ratings and reviews are processed.10 Although 
rating and reputational mechanisms have an important regulatory potential, an uncritical 
reliance on these instruments can be particularly worrisome in the P2P economy, as user-
generated content might be the only instrument that consumers have at their disposal to 
obtain information about the quality and safety of a product.  
In this article, I discuss the extent to which online reputation is able to address 
informational market failures that typically justify the regulation of a number of services 
(e.g., the hospitality sector). I question whether these informal mechanisms would be 
suitable to complement or replace some—but not all—functions of traditional licensure.11 
Considering the shortcomings of reputational mechanisms and the accountability deficit 
that characterizes this type of informal enforcement, I suggest a model of co-regulation 
that could help promote the transparency of reputational systems. This article draws on 
the abundant legal, economic, and business literature on reputation, online word-of-
                                                 
8 See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 
89 J. Pol. Econ. 615 (1981); Chrysanthos Dellarocas, The Digitalization of Word-of-Mouth: Promises and 
Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms, 49 Mgmt. Sci. 1407 (2003); Adam Thierer et al., How the 
Internet, the Sharing Economy, and Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the “Lemons Problem,” 70 
U. Miami L. Rev. 830 (2016); Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Innovation in the 
Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. Dial. 116 (2015). 
9 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, 
COM (2016), 356 final (June 2, 2016) (https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-356-
EN-F1-1.PDF) [hereinafter European Agenda]; Federal Trade Commission, The “Sharing” Economy: Issues 
Facing Platforms, Participants & Regulators, An FTC Staff Report (2016) 
(https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/sharing-economy-issues-facing-platforms-participants-
regulators-federal-trade-commission-staff/p151200_ftc_staff_report_on_the_sharing_economy.pdf). 
10 See Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47 Loyola U. Chi. L.J. 515 (2015); Danielle Citron & Frank 
Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (2014). 
11 Sandeep Vaheesan & Frank Pasquale, The Politics of Professionalism: Reappraising Occupational Licensure and 
Competition Policy, Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. (forthcoming 2018) 
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2881732). 
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mouth (“WoM”), and the sharing economy.12 This article approaches the topic from the 
perspective of the broader transition from formal, public, expert-based regulation to a 
peer-to-peer regulatory state characterized by the growing intervention of private actors 
without particular expertise. Consumer-generated content is, in some cases, preferred to 
expert opinion because it is perceived as more independent and unbiased.13 This 
perception might not always be accurate. This article offers a nuanced reflection on the 
traditional assumption that the disclosure of more information can reduce information 
asymmetries and diminish the need for state intervention. In other words, more 
information about reputation does not necessarily demand “less regulation.”14 
This article is organized as follows: Part I explains how online ratings and 
reputational mechanisms operate in the P2P economy and why they have become an 
important source of consumer information; Part II discusses the shortcomings of online 
reputational feedback; Part III discusses the shift from traditional command-and-control 
regulation to informal and peer-to-peer reputational schemes; and Part IV suggests a co-
regulatory framework that could help the collaboration between private reputational 
systems and public authorization and enforcement mechanisms.  
II. Online Rating and Reputational Systems 
The development of the information society has empowered consumers, who now have 
the ability to access more information, compare services, and hire a large variety of on-
demand providers for occasional services.15 In a globalized world, it has become 
increasingly challenging to obtain reliable information about these services. Ebay, Airbnb, 
EatWith, and many other P2P platforms rely on online ratings and reviews to attract new 
customers and help consumers distinguish between good and bad service providers. After 
each transaction, consumers are asked to write a review about the service they have 
experienced. In some cases, parties review each other’s performance and this reputational 
information will be publicly available for both current and prospective users of a specific 
platform.  
The level of detail and usefulness of online reviews varies greatly, but it is now 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Christoph Busch, Crowdsourcing Consumer Confidence: How to Regulate Online Rating and 
Review Systems in the Collaborative Economy, in European Contract Law and the Digital Single Market: 
The Implications of the Digital Revolution 221 (Alberto de Franceschi ed., 2016); Christoph Busch et al., 
Discussion Draft of a Directive on Online Intermediary Platforms, 6 J. Eur. Consumer & Market L. 164 
(2016). 
13 Ann Marie Marciarille, “How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s Role in Assessing Physician Quality, 
14 DePaul J. Health Care L. 361, 371 (2012). 
14 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Less Regulation, More Reputation, in The Reputation Society, supra note 2, at 63, 
71 (suggesting a complementary role for reputation tracking); see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation 
Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1667 (2008). 
15 Lauren I. Labrecque et al., Consumer Power: Evolution in the Digital Age, 27 J. Interactive Marketing 257 
(2013). Consumer empowerment by information does not mean the consumer is always sovereign and is 
not limited in its choices; for a thorough analysis of these objections, see Adrian Kuenzler, Restoring 
Consumer Sovereignty: How Markets Manipulate Us and What Law Can Do About It (2017). 
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well established that online reputation facilitates not only P2P but also business-to-
consumer (“B2C”) transactions.16 Ratings and reviews provide first-hand information 
about a user or product, rank service providers, and offer an (allegedly) independent 
judgment. This part of the article explains why so many actors—including regulators—
place this amount of trust in online reputational mechanisms.17 
A. Reputation: Information and Trust 
Like our great-grandparents, we still rely on the oldest form of advertisement: 
word-of-mouth (“WoM”). WoM started being studied in the context of corporations in 
the 1960s by Johan Arndt, who defined it as “oral, person-to-person communication 
between a perceived non-commercial communicator and a receiver concerning a brand, a 
product, or a service offered for sale.”18 Since then, a vast amount of literature in the 
fields of marketing, business, socio-psychology, economics, and tourism management has 
documented the effect of WoM on the behavior of both consumers and corporations.19  
1. Online Reputation as a Source of Information 
Reputational mechanisms have been used throughout history to facilitate 
exchanges between strangers and to overcome linguistic and cultural barriers.20 The 
information used to build a good or bad reputation constitutes an effective mechanism to 
change or improve the provider’s behavior, especially under uncertain conditions and 
asymmetric information.21 Nowadays, we observe that the information generated by 
online reviews is particularly relevant in the context of so-called “experience goods,” 
whose qualities will be known only after purchase and use.22 
Reputational models of informal enforcement can be divided into three categories: 
(i) reputation for ability; (ii) reputation for integrity; and (iii) reputation for performance.23 
                                                 
16 Zhiwei Liu & Sangwon Park, What Makes a Useful Online Review? Implication for Travel Product 
Websites, 47 Tourist Mgmt. 140 (2015). 
17 See Kenneth H. Craik, Reputation: A Network Interpretation (2009). 
18 Johan Arndt, Word of Mouth Advertising and Informal Communication, in Risk Taking and Information 
Handling in Consumer Behavior (Donald F. Cox ed., 1967); Johan Arndt, Role of Product-Related 
Conversations in the Diffusion of a New Product, 4 J. Marketing Res. 291 (1967). 
19 Dellarocas, supra note 8; Steven Tadelis, The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism, 110 J. 
Pol. Econ. 854 (2002). 
20 Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Trader, 49 J. Econ. 
Hist. 857 (1989). 
21 Lisa Trigg, Using Online Reviews in Social Care, 48 Soc. Pol’y & Admin. 361 (2014). 
22 For a distinction between “experience” and “search goods,” see Philip Nelson, Information and 
Consumer Behavior, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 311 (1970); Philip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. Pol. Econ. 729 
(1974). 
23 W. Bentley MacLeod, Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts, CESifo 
Working Paper Series No. 1730; IZA Discussion Paper No. 1978 (May 2006) 
(https://ssrn.com/abstract=885347). 
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These different types of reputation may be present more in some sectors than in others 
(e.g., payment platforms will invest in their reputation for integrity) and they may also be 
cumulative. In the P2P home-sharing sectors, users providing services try to build a good 
reputation for friendliness, hospitality, and comfortable accommodation offerings. In the 
services sectors (e.g., car sharing), platforms ask users to rate service providers on their 
performance as well as on the safety of the vehicle. 
An empirical study conducted by Pew Research in the United States has shown 
that an overwhelming majority of consumers (82%) read online reviews in order to decide 
which hotel, restaurant or electronic product to choose.24 Online reviews are consulted on 
a regular basis as they are easily accessible, brief, and offer immediate information.25 
Reputational feedback mechanisms reduce search costs and help consumers navigate the 
vast amount of information published on digital platforms. A clear presentation of ratings 
and reviews decreases search costs, as consumers can choose to read only positive or 
negative comments or to view only the services that have been assessed positively. 
However, the abundance of online reviews has also meant that consumers bear additional 
cognitive costs as information becomes more difficult to process.26 As George Stigler 
famously explained, consumers will only seek information until the point that search costs 
equal the value of the information; put another way, a greater number of reviews will not 
necessary help consumers make a better decision.27 
A reputational feedback system is nevertheless effective only if consumers are 
willing to leave a rating or review after their purchase. In the abovementioned empirical 
study, Pew Research concluded that 71% of consumers aged 18-49 (and 49% of those age 
fifty and older) are indeed willing to leave a review after experiencing a service.28 On many 
P2P platforms, users are required to review each other and can book the next transaction 
only after having reviewed their previous transaction. As the number of reviews grows on 
B2C and P2P platforms, reputational feedback has become one of the most important 
sources of information for consumers, providing them with an informative but low-
threshold podium.29  
2. Online Reputation and Trust 
Reputation is a social concept that lays the foundations for trust between 
strangers. Like other trust-based relationships, these systems ensure that users are willing 
                                                 
24 Pew Research, Online Shopping & E-Commerce (Dec. 19, 2016) 
(http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/12/19/online-reviews/).  
25 Marciarille, supra note 13, at 371. 
26 Liu & Park, supra note 16. 
27 George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961). 
28 Pew Research, supra note 24.  
29 See Qiang Ye et al., The Influence of User-Generated Content on Traveler Behavior: An Empirical 
Investigation on the Effects of E-Word-of-Mouth to Hotel Online Bookings, 27 Comput. Hum. Behav. 634 
(2011). 
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to expose themselves to certain vulnerabilities because they have positive expectations 
regarding the counterparty. Reputation is valuable when consumers and service providers 
expect to interact on multiple occasions with a set of agents (e.g., restaurateurs expect 
customers to return) and when there are sanctions in place for those who do not 
cooperate.30 This repeated interaction means that if one of the parties does not live up to 
her reputation, the collaboration will come to an end or the cheating partner will be 
sanctioned (e.g., her account on the platform will be deactivated, her reputation will be 
damaged).31 Reputation thus promotes both trust and reciprocity in trade as parties have 
an interest in living up to expectations.32 In addition, businesses and individuals rely 
nowadays on online reviews to assess how well they are performing.33  
B. The Legal Relevance of Reputation 
Given the importance and the fragile character of this asset, reputation is legally 
protected in different ways.34 “Good name” and “reputation” have long been regarded in 
the literature, case law, and even some U.S. state constitutions35 as “interest(s) justifying 
legal protection.”36 Thus far, the legal relevance of reputation has been threefold. First, 
reputation has been protected against defamation through tort law.37 Second, the sanction 
of naming and shaming engages the interest that corporations and individuals have in 
their reputations38 The fear of reputational damage through this type of reputational 
sanction provides strong compliance incentives as the damage caused to reputation is 
often irreparable.39 As the saying goes, “Trust arrives walking but it departs riding.” Third, 
                                                 
30 Julia K. Lee, Trust and Social Commerce, 77 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 139 (2015). 
31 Hans Caspar von der Crone & Johannes Vetsch, Reputation and Regulation, in Reputation Capital: Building 
and Maintaining Trust in the 21st Century 180 (Joachim Klewes & Robert Wreschniok eds., 2009); see also Paul 
Robert Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization, and Management (1992). 
32 John Duffy et al., Social Norms, Information and Trust Among Strangers: Theory and Evidence, 52 
Econ. Theory 669 (2013). 
33 Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, Regulating Online Buzz Marketing: Untangling a Web of Deceit, 47 
Am. Bus. L.J. 415 (2010).  
34 Laura Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1341 (2001). 
35 Indiana Const., art. 1, § 12 (“[A]ll courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his 
person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.”) 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., Eric Descheemaeker, Protecting Reputation: Defamation and Negligence, 29 Oxford J. Legal 
Stud. 603 (2009); David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 747 
(1984); Heymann, supra note 34; Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation 
and the Constitution, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 691 (1986). 
38 Naming and shaming sanctions tend to be more effective than financial penalties as they attack the most 
valuable asset of a firm: its good reputation. In the offline and online worlds, shaming sanctions are 
particularly relevant in communities where individuals interact on a regular basis and share common values. 
See David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming on Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1811. 
39 On the general impact of reputational sanctions, see Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Impact of Publicity 
on Corporate Offenders (1983). 
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the legal relevance of reputation is also visible in its use as a complement to contractual 
arrangements and civil litigation.40 This complementary character has been employed to 
reduce litigation costs, support executory contracts, and monitor product quality.41  
III. The Shortcomings of Reputational Mechanisms 
While ratings and reviews can be informative and can provide unique insights, 
reputational mechanisms operate in an obscure way. Platforms often organize comments 
strategically in order to down-rank negative comments and calculate ratings according to 
doubtful formulas.42 Therefore, the existing empirical studies on reputational mechanisms 
have revealed mixed results on the veracity and trustworthiness of these mechanisms.43 In 
this Part, I explore the current shortcomings of online reputational mechanisms.  
A. Content, Usefulness, and Objectivity of Review 
When scrolling through major P2P platforms, we might quickly realize that the 
overwhelming majority of reviews are positive. This phenomenon has also been explored 
in the media, which found that some consumers leave “five-star reviews” due to feelings 
of guilt.44 Consumers fear that a four-star-rating will not be sufficient for an Uber driver 
to keep her account so they give her a more generous score and fail to disclose some 
moderate flaws of the service. But, as underlined in the mentioned article, “When 
everything gets a five, nothing gets a five,” and the ability of ratings and reviews to 
influence behavior gets lost. One of the major shortcomings of online rating and 
reputational mechanisms resides in this biased and non-expert attitude of reviewers. 
While the quality control exerted by online reviewers might be continuous and 
allow for a daily control of the performance of service providers, this evaluation will be 
done with varying standards of quality, hygiene, and value for money.45  
Research has shown that moderate, detailed, and well-written personal 
testimonials will be perceived by prospective consumers as more useful and credible.46 
                                                 
40 Barak D. Richman, The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted 
Refusals to Deal, 95 Vand. L. Rev. 325 (2009). 
41 See Ronald Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between 
Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509 (1994); Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 5; Bernstein, Private 
Commercial Law, supra note 5; Juan Jose Ganuza, Fernando Gomes & Marta Robles, Product Liability 
Versus Reputation, J.L., Econ. & Org. 1 (2016); Klein & Leffler, supra note 8. 
42 See Joseph M. Reagle, Reading the Comments (2015) (offering an extensive analysis of the diversity of 
online comments and exploring how some actors manipulate and monopolize reputational feedback). 
43 Frank Pasquale, Reputation Regulation: Disclosure and the Challenge of Clandestinely Commensurating 
Computing, in The Offensive Internet: Privacy, Speech, and Reputation 107 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. 
Nussbaum eds., 2010). 
44 Ethan Wolff-Mann, Here’s Everything Wrong with Online Reviews and How to Fix It, Time (July 22, 
2016) (http://time.com/money/page/online-reviews-trust-fix/).  
45 Vasiliki Baka, The Becoming of User-generated Reviews: Looking at the Past to Understand the Future of 
Managing Reputation in the Travel Sector, 53 Tourism Mgmt. 148, 158 (2016). 
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However, the same study also underlines that those same online reviews will influence 
consumers differently, for they tend to identify themselves more with some types of 
content and style rather than with others.47 What is said, how it is said, and who says it can 
influence the assessment of the credibility of reviews as well as their impact on 
prospective behavior in many ways. 48  
To illustrate, in the case of Airbnb (and other sharing economy platforms), 
prospective guests make decisions on whether or not to trust the host partially based on 
her personal photos or social media profile.49 Individuals generally perceive uncertainty in 
interpersonal relationships as an unpleasant element, and so the disclosure of one’s 
identity helps build trust among participants in the digital economy.50 This trust is, 
therefore, derived from subjective elements that are not explained by the reviewer’s ability 
to assess a service accurately.  
B. Fake Reviews and other Unfair Practices 
Online rating and reputational mechanisms suffer from the same problem as any 
other type of user-generated content: reviews are unfiltered, directly produced by users, 
and are often connected to social media profiles.51 In this context, it is difficult to assess 
the veracity of the review and limit the spread of “opinion spam,” meaning fake reviews 
and deceptive messages.52 Designing a system that incentivizes honest reviews and 
penalizes deceptive comments remains challenging: low-threshold systems might be easily 
manipulated by providers but complex systems will face limited consumer participation. 
Contrary to some service providers or product sellers, platforms have a direct interest in 
guaranteeing a trustworthy environment and, therefore, have incentives to encourage 
consumers to give their honest opinions on services.53 
At the time of writing, at least two European regulators are devoting attention to 
the need to improve the transparency and trustworthiness of online rating and 
reputational mechanisms. The UK Competition & Market Authority (CMA) has been 
gathering information on online reviews and endorsements since 2015 and working with 
                                                                                                                                             
46 Blanca Hernandez-Ortega, Don’t Believe Strangers: Online Consumer Reviews and the Role of Social 
Psychological Distance, 55 Info. & Mgmt. 31 (2018) (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315898293_Don’t_ 
Believe_Strangers_Online_Consumer_Reviews_and_the_Role_of_Social_Psychological_Distance). 
47 Id. 
48 Liu & Park, supra note 16. 
49 Eyal Ert et al., Trust and Reputation in the Sharing Economy: The Role of Personal Photos in Airbnb, 55 
Tourism Mgmt. 62 (2016). 
50 Hernandez-Ortega, supra note 46. 
51 Marco Viviani & Gabriella Pasi, Quantifier Guided Aggregation for the Veracity Assessment of Online 
Reviews, 32 Int’l J. Intelligent Sys. 481 (2017). 
52 Id. 
53 Lirong Chen et al., Who Should Pay for Online Reviews? Design of an Online User Feedback System, 23 
Electronic Com. Res. & Applications 38 (2017). 
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platforms to address potentially misleading practices, such as the publication of fake 
reviews, omission of negative reviews, and paid reviews.54 In 2016, the CMA took action 
against an online marketing company that posted fake reviews and breached the 
Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.  
In May 2017, the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets released the 
outcomes of a consumer survey, concluding that more transparency in the publication 
and management of reviews is required.55 The Dutch regulator established that consumers 
currently make use of online reviews to a substantial and increasing degree, particularly 
when choosing electronic products, hotels, and restaurants. However, consumers do not 
rely on online reviews only in the orientation phase but remain critical and aware that 
some reviews might have been deleted or that their content might not be trustworthy.56  
C. Transparency and Due Process Rights 
At a time when the lives of users have become increasingly transparent and 
subject to extensive scrutiny and constant review, secrecy is still the norm for the digital 
platforms that rely upon rating and reputational mechanisms.57 It is, for example, often 
unclear why users see some reviews first even though they do not reflect the most recent 
transactions. On the “Support Center” page of Yelp, the platform tries to provide more 
information to users on “how Yelp decides which reviews to feature in the search 
results,”58 but their answer—“the review snippets that appear on search result pages are 
determined algorithmically like the search ranking themselves”—does not shed much 
light on the question. Although the use of algorithms appears to confer an objective 
character on the platform’s decision-making, these algorithms are informed by data that 
reflect certain preferences.59 
At the moment, there is little transparency surrounding information selection and 
few rules that can ensure reputational integrity in the platform economy. This obscurity 
affects not only the legitimacy of online reputational mechanisms but also the due process 
                                                 
54 Competition Market & Competition Authority, Online Reviews and Endorsements 
(https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-reviews-and-endorsements). 
55 Dutch Authority for Consumers & Market, Press Release: ACM Calls for Increased Transparency in 
Online Reviews (May 11, 2017) (https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/17222/ACM-calls-for-
increased-transparency-in-online-reviews/). 
56 See also Jason Q. Zhang et al., When Does Electronic Word-of-Mouth Matter? A Matter of Consumer 
Product Reviews, 63 J. Bus. Res. 1336 (2010) (evaluating the different impacts of reviews depending on the 
consumption goal). 
57 See David Brin, The Transparent Society (1999) (exposing the paradox between the growing exposure of 
individuals to privacy-invasive technologies and the secrecy of powerful corporate and governmental 
monopolies). 
58 Yelp, Yelp Support Center (https://www.yelp-support.com/article/How-does-Yelp-decide-which-
reviews-to-feature-in-search-results?l=en_US). 
59 Rob Kitchin, Thinking Critically About and Researching Algorithms, 20 Info., Comm. & Soc. 14, 18 (2017). 
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right of individuals.60 Despite the lack of expertise and accuracy, negative reviews—
though scarce—have a disproportionate effect on consumer behavior and may have 
disastrous consequences for users.61 A low rating or a number of negative reviews can 
result in the deactivation of a service provider’s account without the right to contest the 
content of these ratings or reviews. Online reputational mechanisms add to the current 
problem of constant workplace surveillance and enhanced pressure to perform under 
permanent monitoring.62  
A right to respond to unfavorable ratings and reviews has been defended for a 
number of years in the literature, but there is evidence that service providers’ responses 
can often be counterproductive.63 Individuals tend to perceive negative reviews as 
personal attacks and respond in a defensive and irrational manner.64 
D. Legitimacy and Accountability  
Meaningful accountability for ratings and reviews is also lacking in the platform 
economy. Rating and reputational platforms tend to be exempt from any form of liability 
as long as they operate in “good faith” and remove material that they believe to be 
obscene or violent.65 In Europe and in the United States digital platforms are typically not 
responsible for user-generated content as long as they only host that content.66 This leaves 
us with an accountability deficit: in the platform economy, no one is held accountable for 
the information produced on these platforms and the deficient quality and safety 
assessment conducted by the reviewers. It is the users’ responsibility to be critical when 
choosing a P2P service but platforms have not been included in this equation. Thus far, 
there have been attempts to hold sites that provide ratings of attorneys and physicians 
more accountable for the content produced by users.67  
The literature and regulators are thus at a crossroads: on the one hand, online 
rating and reputational mechanisms have become important information sources that 
                                                 
60 Pasquale, supra note 10; see also Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Sellinger, Surveillance as Loss of Obscurity, 
72 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1343 (2015). 
61 M.S. Balaji et al., Determinants of Negative Word-of-Mouth Communication Using Social Networking 
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62 See Ifeoma Ajunwa et al., Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 Cal. L. Rev. 735 (2017) (offering an 
extensive analysis of the problem of ubiquitous workplace surveillance and the need to protect worker 
privacy). 
63 Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 Clev. St. L. Rev. 117 (2006); Robertson, 
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64 The literature has documented why individuals react irrationally to criticism. See Andrew M. Perlman, A 
Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 Ind. L.J. 1639 (2015); Peter M. Gollwitzer & John A. Bargh, The 
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65 Gus Hurwitz, Trust and Online Interaction, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1579 (2013). 
66 See James Grimmelman, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 36 (2007). 
67 Browne v. Avvo, 525 F. Supp. 2d. 1249 (W.D. Wa. 2007); see Grimmelman, supra note 66. 
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influence both consumers and service providers while, on the other, these mechanisms 
remain subjective, biased, and unreliable. The following Part explores this paradox in the 
context of the shift from traditional regulation to P2P validation.  
IV. Regulation: From Command-and-Control to Peer-to-Peer Regulation 
The sharing economy has disrupted longstanding sets of national and local regulations, 
particularly in the sectors of private transportation, hospitality, and restauration, where 
actors are required to comply with both ex ante and ex post regulations (e.g., licenses, 
permits, occasional or regular inspections). 68 Sharing economy platforms question the 
need for these longstanding rules, arguing that their self-regulatory model promotes 
economic growth and flexibility that is highly appreciated by users.69 In addition, these 
platforms have put pressure on regulators to be more transparent about the real goals of 
public intervention and its ability to address public interests.70 Platforms and supporters 
of the sharing economy also argue that rating and reputational systems address potential 
concerns and reduce risks to the public.71 Not surprisingly, service providers operating in 
the traditional sectors, consumer organizations, scholars concerned with the negative 
externalities of platform capitalism, and multiple national regulators beg to differ.72  
Unlicensed sharing economy services have caused much uproar, both in the 
literature and in physical spaces, with numerous demonstrations carried out in large 
European and American cities. In European countries such as Belgium, Germany, and the 
Netherlands, courts and sectorial regulators have prohibited these services and even 
imposed criminal sanctions on unlicensed Uber drivers.73 The value of online reputational 
mechanisms has been rarely considered in these decisions as a risk-management tool, 
despite the European Commission’s favorable position toward online ratings and reviews. 
In a 2016 Communication, “A European Agenda for the Collaborative 
Economy,” the European Commission praised online reputational mechanisms for 
                                                 
68 See Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing Economy, 16 
Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 414 (2015); Stephen Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 
Harv. J. Legis. 147 (2016). 
69 For an overview of the different narratives in this context, see Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of 
Platform Capitalism, 35 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 309 (2016). 
70 Nestor Davidson & John J. Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an Urban Phenomenon, 34 Yale L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 216 (2016). 
71 Thierer et al., supra note 8. 
72 See, e.g., Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. Dial. 85 (2015); Miriam A. Cherry, 
A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 951 (2011); Trebor Scholz, Platform Cooperativism vs. the 
Sharing Economy, MEDIUM (Dec. 5, 2014) (http://medium.com/@trebors/platform-cooperativism-vs-
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Tom Slee, What’s Yours Is Mine: Against the Sharing Economy (2015). 
73 Caroline Cauffman & Jan Smits, The Sharing Economy and the Law, 23 Maastricht J. EU & Comp. L. 
903 (2016). 
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“discourag[ing] harmful behavior by market participants [and] . . . in some cases 
reduc[ing] risks for consumers stemming from information asymmetries.”74 The 
European Commission highlighted that these mechanisms could “reduce the need for 
certain elements of regulation, provided adequate trust can be placed in the quality of the 
reviews and ratings.”75 The European Commission also advised national regulatory bodies 
to limit their regulatory interventions to the strict protection of the public interest in line 
with the existing Internal Market rules and the Services Directive. It further advised them 
to consider the specific features of collaborative economy business models as well as “the 
tools they may put in place to address public policy concerns, for instance in relation to 
access, quality or safety.”76 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has, thus far, followed a similar 
approach in its 2016 report on the sharing economy, which underlined the importance of 
rating and reputational mechanisms for the reduction of information asymmetries and 
other risks in the sharing economy.77 Both regulators appear to acknowledge the ability of 
online rating and reputational mechanisms to replace or complement traditional 
regulation in the P2P and B2C economies but do not explain whether they respond to the 
traditional criticism to command-and-control regulation. This Part offers a reflection on 
this subject by drawing upon the foundational literature on public and private-interest 
regulation. 
A. Public vs. Private Interest Theories of Regulation 
Regulation traditionally refers to top-down, deliberate attempts of the state to 
address market failures and protect the public interest.78 Although this traditional idea of 
command-and-control standards and rules still reigns in practice, there is no generally 
accepted definition of regulation nor of its toolbox.79 A broader definition of regulation 
would, therefore, encompass all forms of social control, whether intentional or not, 
stemming from either public or private organizations.80 An oft-cited definition of 
regulation places the emphasis on the instrumental function of regulation, stating that 
regulation is “[t]he sustained and focused attempt to alter the behavior of others 
according to standards or goals with the intention of producing a more broadly identified 
outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-
                                                 
74 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A European Agenda for the 
Collaborative Economy, COM (2016) 356 final. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 9. 
78 See Anthony Ogus, Regulation: Legal, Form and Economic Theory (2004). 
79 OECD, OECD Report on Regulatory Reform: Synthesis (1997) (https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-
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gathering and behavior-modification.”81 In the platform economy, a great deal of social 
control is exerted by P2P monitoring. Ratings and reviews set standards of quality that 
allow consumers to distinguish between the different service providers.  
At the moment, the platform economy is characterized by different regulatory 
situations: licensed hotels and restaurants that use booking platforms such as 
Booking.com, Expedia, or OpenTable are subject to an array of public regulations, such 
as licensing schemes, but also take into account online reputational mechanisms. In the 
P2P economy, there is limited or no public control of the services provided on digital 
platforms and users rely primarily on rating and reputational mechanisms to obtain 
information on a service’s quality and safety. The relatively low number of incidents, the 
longstanding objections to the obsolescence of traditional regulation, and the need to 
advance less burdensome rules support the suggestion that self-regulation and online 
reputation could potentially replace state intervention. Nevertheless, as this section 
explains, the shift from public to P2P regulation implicates a deeper analysis of the ability 
of reputational mechanisms to address market failures effectively. 
Public interest theories of regulation justify regulatory intervention with the need 
to promote social welfare and address market failures, such as negative externalities like 
noise.82 In the hospitality sector, the information asymmetry between the service 
providers and consumers, along with the health and safety risks to which a consumer is 
exposed when eating or sleeping at a foreign establishment, justified the need for the 
extensive regulation of entry.83 In all of these cases, regulation (e.g., operating licensure, 
certification) is justified by the existence of information asymmetries and the consequent 
inability of consumers to assess the performance of a service provider before engaging in 
a transaction.84  
In the European Union, the regulation of entry is subject to a number of 
limitations. While Member States may regulate access to certain professions, national 
requirements should be justified by the protection of the public interest. In addition, 
Member States are required to reduce or eliminate any disproportionate barriers to the 
freedom of circulation of services. National authorization schemes must be based on 
clear, unambiguous, transparent, and objective criteria to prevent the arbitrariness of 
                                                 
81 Julia Black, What Is Regulatory Innovation, in Regulatory Innovation 11 (Julia Black et al. eds., 2005). 
This definition also draws on the work of Christopher Hood et al., The Government of Risk (2001).  
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national authorities.85 These safeguards are particularly relevant in the sectors where the 
Services Directive has been implemented, which include the hospitality sector but exclude 
transportation services (e.g., ride-sharing platforms).86  
The traditional public interest justification of regulation has been criticized on 
several fronts since the 1970s. Private interest scholars contended that regulation was 
driven by interest groups, regulators were easily captured by the industry, and the 
regulatory arena was determined by a small number of regulation-seeking groups rather 
than by the collective welfare.87 This “capture effect” also meant that traditional regulation 
was regarded as an instrument to limit competition from other providers rather than a 
primary tool to safeguard the quality of services and protect the public interest.88 Despite 
the academic relevance of this critique, it was not supported by strong empirical evidence 
and provided little guidance to help detect and correct capture.89 
The criticism of public-interest regulation was also visible in the context of 
occupational licensing (e.g., of physicians), which was also created to regulate the quality 
of professions. Since the medieval guilds, multiple professions were allowed to self-
regulate and decide who was allowed to join the profession and under what conditions, 
often collaborating closely with city councils to regulate the exchange and production of 
goods.90 As described in the work of Parsons, the interests of these professions were 
thought to be intertwined with those of the public.91  
Throughout the centuries, multiple occupation groups appeared to be driven by 
the wish to maintain their acquired prestige rather than by altruistic motives.92 This raised 
questions of whether self-regulation sufficed and whether regulation served the interests 
of the public or those of a private group.93 Most traditional studies submit that licensing 
regulations and other authorization schemes were adopted to restrict entry and reduce 
competition.94 Recent research also suggests these regulations were indeed enacted as a 
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reaction to growing risks to public safety, and to improve markets at a time when services 
where changing and advances in knowledge made it increasingly difficult for consumers to 
judge the quality of professional services.95 One of the challenges of determining the 
interests underlying the need for public regulation resides in the absence of empirical 
evidence and the broad objections raised against regulatory capture.96  
In view of the decades of critiques aimed at the public interest arguments of 
regulation, several alternatives to the traditional command-and-control regulation have 
been suggested: the deregulation of industries; market-based approaches including 
pollution taxes and environmental benefit trading; self-regulation (e.g., in the financial 
sector); the establishment of public-private partnerships; delegation of rulemaking tasks to 
national and international certification bodies (e.g., sports, construction); co-regulation 
(e.g., media, food safety); the adoption of soft law and codes of conduct; and, more 
recently in some European countries, “the right to challenge.”97  
In the context of the growing intervention of private actors in regulation, we also 
observe the partial outsourcing of regulatory tasks to private actors justified by efficiency 
gains, enhanced expertise, potential for higher level of compliance, and the importance of 
involving different stakeholders.98 This article regards online reputation as a separate, 
private enforcement mechanism that can complement traditional regulation. 
B. Peer-to-Peer Regulation 
The criticism of the public-interest justification of traditional regulation does not 
fully explain the shift to the modern system of P2P reviews. First, the legitimacy of the 
individuals rating and writing reviews is unclear. On the one hand, reputational 
mechanisms contribute to the democratic legitimacy of regulation since they enhance the 
broad participation of citizens in the economy;99 they empower consumers with 
information and allow them to have a say. On the other hand, reputational mechanisms 
do not promote a true democratic pooling of expertise or a true empowerment of the 
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crowd.100 Many of the users who write reviews do so to promote personal agendas, to 
improve their own reputation, or to be eligible for a discount from a digital platform.101 In 
addition, search engines and platforms rearrange the content, streamlining what we see in 
practice. Some platforms assign the title of “expert” to frequent reviewers (e.g., the Yelp 
Elite Squad), but although they are able to offer multiple narratives of first-hand 
experience, it is unlikely that these individuals are more knowledgeable than regulators.102 
Therefore, reputational mechanisms disrupt not only the object but also the subjects 
behind regulation: in the P2P economy, the regulatory instrument (i.e., the reviews) can be 
generated by any consumer, regardless of expertise.  
Second, online reputation combines limited forms of self-regulation (e.g., conflict 
resolution services, basic forms for rating and processing of reviews) with the wisdom of 
the crowds. Therefore, it is likely that, in some cases, the regulatory effect of reputational 
mechanisms stems from the content of reviews rather than from the platform’s self-
regulatory efforts. 
Third, online rating and reputational mechanisms respond to the trust deficit that 
emerged in a novel situation that traditional regulation had not considered previously: the 
emergence of digital platforms where non-professionals could share goods with or 
provide services to each other. Users in the platform economy interact with individuals 
who are often unlicensed, unregistered non-professionals and, above all, strangers who 
could poison or hurt prospective consumers. Under these circumstances, users are 
required to trust each other and feel protected against major risks. In regulated markets, 
this measure of protection is typically offered by regulation that reduces mistrust in 
counterparties by addressing common problems such as moral hazard or high search 
costs.103  
Despite its informal character, online reputation provides incentives to individuals 
to change their behavior. However, this reputational system is far from perfect. The 
deficiencies of current reputational mechanisms affect their ability to protect users 
effectively against several risks because the information provided on P2P platforms often 
refers to quality features of products and services (e.g., a host’s friendliness), may be 
biased, and is processed in a non-transparent way. The informative and trust-building 
potentials of online reputation should not be disregarded, but they may not be enough to 
address market failures and manage important risks to consumers.  
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V. A Collaborative Framework for Online Reputation 
Up until now, several regulators have focused on enforcing existing rules in spite of their 
ability to respond to the innovative elements of the platform economy. This formal 
approach to regulation does not work well in the context of informal enforcement 
mechanisms that may also address some—but not all—risks of the platform economy.104 
In this Part, I suggest a co-regulatory or collaborative approach for the interaction 
between online reputational mechanisms and traditional regulation. Regulators can benefit 
from more transparent online reputational mechanisms, as they can rely on their 
information to identify problematic service providers that might require regulatory 
intervention. Online reputational mechanisms will also be more effective in managing 
risks if they process information in a clear and accountable way and if they are regulated.  
A. Reduce Enforcement Costs 
Regulatory conversations and a closer cooperation between platforms, regulators, 
and other stakeholders can help regulators manage risks that currently characterize the 
platform economy as well as reduce enforcement costs.105 While official inspections of 
facilities take place in some sectors on a yearly basis, online reviews inspect the service 
and some of the facilities of restaurants, hotels, and equivalent P2P services on a daily 
basis. Online reputational mechanisms can alert public bodies to problems that would 
otherwise only be immediately identified after a formal complaint. 
Rating and reputational systems complement traditional regulation by offering 
additional information and evidence that would otherwise be difficult to gather. In March 
2017, the highest administrative court in the Netherlands criticized local enforcement 
officers for not considering the data included in the online reviews on Airbnb.106 This 
public information could help public bodies ascertain whether users are in violation of 
local rules and proffer valid evidence to consubstantiate these infringements.  
B. Co-regulation for Transparency 
Reputational mechanisms rely on the observation of past actions and the ability to 
predict future performance on this ground. Nevertheless, observability is an imperfect 
method that only provides anecdotal evidence.107 Online reputation results from the 
“noise” and the appearances created by a majority of voices. Reputational mechanisms 
might be untrustworthy if consumers, platforms, and regulators do not work together to 
overcome the limitations of this system—in particular, the scarce ratings, differing tastes, 
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and attempts to tamper with the system. The trustworthiness of online reputation as an 
effective regulatory mechanism depends on its ability to reduce the gap between the 
message conveyed by someone’s reputation and the reality.  
 Once a user has built a sufficiently strong reputation, she might not have 
incentives for further investment and improvement. In addition, quality signals emitted by 
online reputation also fail. It is precisely when there is the risk that these signals might fail 
that consumers should be able to trust regulators to offer them protection, namely 
through the regulation of minimum standards of safety and quality.108  
Even when users are aware of the fact that the reviews might not be accurate or 
reflect any particular expertise, they take them into account because they trust that digital 
platforms have not been significantly altered. As Jack Balkin explains, digital platforms 
should be regarded as information fiduciaries and as such, they owe a duty of care and a 
duty of loyalty to their users.109 This means that they should act competently and, in the 
case of online rating and reviews, ensure that the reviews are as truthful and accurate as 
possible. 
While we cannot expect online reputational mechanisms to be infallible and 
always just, regulators should ensure that these systems operate in a context of procedural 
regularity. Platforms should be able to explain how ratings are calculated and live up to 
some standard of fairness and accuracy. Drawing on the scholarship of Danielle Citron 
and Frank Pasquale, it could be suggested that online rating and reputational mechanisms 
draw insights from the idea of a “technological due process”110—a systematic approach to 
deciding between automation and human discretion and ensuring that the general 
principles of good administration are not affected by an unaccountable delegation of 
regulatory tasks to informal or P2P enforcement mechanisms. Online rating and 
reputational mechanisms do not yet reflect the core values served by due process, those 
being accuracy, objectivity, the appearance of fairness, predictability, rationality, and 
participation.111 
Platforms can be given incentives to improve their current self-regulatory 
practices and their online rating and reputational mechanisms in order to guarantee that 
these instruments become more transparent and effective. Users write reviews following 
the forms they are provided with. Therefore, more accurate questions on key quality and 
safety aspects can significantly improve current systems. In addition, regulators should 
work together with platforms to address some of the negative externalities of unregulated 
services, namely potential socially harmful behavior. A closer cooperation between formal 
                                                 
108 von der Crone & Vetsch, supra note 31, at 192. 
109 Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1185, 1207-78 (2016). 
110 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 10, at 19-20; Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 Wash. 
L. Rev. 1249 (2008).  
111 Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive 
Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 93, 119 (2014). 
146 Critical Analysis of Law 5:1 (2018) 
 
 
and informal enforcement mechanisms might benefit not only public bodies but also the 
reliability of online reputational mechanisms.  
As described in Part II, online reviews are plagued by subjective information and 
affected by the obscure character of platforms. Regulators and scholars have recently 
started to think about solutions for these problems. In May 2017, the Dutch Authority for 
Consumers & Markets suggested a number of improvements to the current system of 
online reviews, including informing consumers on how reviews are aggregated and 
presented; treating positive and negative reviews equally as much as possible; publishing 
online reviews expeditiously; ranking the most recent reviews by date of publication rather 
than date of writing; and providing additional information on the circumstances under 
which the reviews were written (e.g., “Reviewers were allowed to test this product for 
free” or “The reviewer received a remuneration for writing this review”).  
VI. Conclusion 
The high costs and failures of regulation and its public interest rationale have been well 
documented in the literature in recent years. Therefore, it could be tempting to suggest 
relying solely on self-regulatory and reputational solutions, but this article has shown that, 
despite their informative role, relying on these solutions might be a simplistic and 
incomplete approach to the imperfect information that characterizes the platform 
economy. Online reputation does not come at zero cost and it also requires the existence 
of effective sanctions.112 Moreover, in the context of the platform economy, reputational 
feedback does not create a scenario of perfect information—it merely creates the illusion 
thereof. Rating and reputational systems remain black boxes which might not always 
produce sufficient and objective information to avoid accidents or manage other 
consumer risks. In the context of imperfect information, accidents might still happen, 
even when parties value their good name and reputation.  
It is precisely here that the interaction between online reputation and regulatory 
intervention should be explored. As explained in the literature on product liability, the 
design of legal regulations should take into account the existence and effectiveness of 
private instruments such as market reputation.113 Traditional authorization schemes do 
not yet take into account the ability of consumers to provide information to each other, 
nor do they reckon with the general flow of information on the Internet. As information 
becomes a stronger regulatory instrument, traditional regulators should indeed consider 
reputational systems as complements to traditional state intervention.  
While online reputational mechanisms might never be fully objective, a closer 
interaction with regulators can ensure that information provided by users is used to 
facilitate public enforcement, regulation is more regularly updated, different stakeholders 
                                                 
112 Ganuza & Gomez, supra note 3, at 233. 
113 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1437, 
1449, 1457 (2009). 
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are heard, consumers are empowered with greater transparency regarding how their 
reviews are processed, and the accountability deficit of reputational mechanisms is 
addressed.114 Online reputation might never be a totally objective, costless, and unbiased 
regulatory instrument—but, then again, neither is command-and-control regulation. 
                                                 
114 Pasquale, supra note 43, at 108. 
